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The persisting legacies of imperial elites among contemporary top-ranked 
Vietnamese politicians 
Tien Manh Vu† and Hiroyuki Yamada†† 
 
Abstract 
This study investigated how the legacies of Vietnamese elites continue to affect top-ranked 
politicians in Vietnam. We therefore compared a list of elites who passed the imperial 
examination (1075–1919) at the national level with a list of currently active Vietnamese top-
ranked politicians (1930–2020) by matching their home districts. We used the average distance 
from each district to imperial test venues as instrumental variables for estimating possible 
connections at the district level. Results showed strong and persistent imperial legacies based 
on these home districts. This suggests the existence of persistent transmissions via informal 
institutions and channels of home favoritism. 
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1. Introduction 
People of the mid-20th century witnessed the rise of communism throughout the world 
while many former colonies gained independence. In this regard, the Communist Party of 
Vietnam (CPV) was a pioneer. Its initial aims were to free the country from oppressive French 
colonialism, terminate the monarchical regime, and transition to communism. Members of the 
CPV distinguished themselves from those working in previous institutions while holding 
power in 1945 and continued to do so even after reunification in 1975. As communists, they 
defined themselves as the leaders of a revolutionary faction. 
Meanwhile, a rich body of literature shows that historical legacies have continued to 
persist, even through formal institutional changes (for specific reviews, see Nunn, 2020). 
Recent investigations into the impacts of imperial elites on contemporary educational outcomes 
and revolutions have also revealed strong connections. Chen et al. (2020) found that more 
imperial elites were associated with higher average years of schooling in contemporary China. 
Vu and Yamada (2020) showed a similar connection in Vietnam, thus indicating the influence 
of a strong legacy (via learning culture) on educational quality despite the termination of 
Chinese script in the Vietnamese written language. Notably, Bai and Jia (2016) investigated 
higher quotas on entry level imperial examinations, thus finding a higher corresponding 
probability of revolution after the examinations were removed. They also argued that this 
resulted in a cessation of access to higher social classes. As such, those who expected to 
become elites actually became revolutionaries. Meanwhile, Bai (2019) found that the quota 
was also associated with higher numbers of “new” Chinese elites who acquired their educations 
abroad. 
Unlike China, Vietnam spent additional decades passing between French colonialism 
and monarchy following the last imperial examination in 1919. This arrangement continued 
based on a North–South division until the emergence of today’s regime in the whole country 
after reunification in 1975. This poses the question of whether a similar mechanism can explain 
a similar legacy in Vietnam. As such, this study investigated whether the imperial legacy still 
influenced contemporary top-ranked communists and what channels may have affected this 
transmission. More specifically, we searched for connections between the historical numbers 
of imperial elites and numbers of top-ranked communists in terms of their respective home 
districts. In this regard, Vietnamese imperial elites were considered those who passed the 
imperial examination between 1075 and 1919 at the national level. On the other hand, top-
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ranked communists were considered members of the Central Committee of the CPV throughout 
its history. These politicians are probably the most powerful people in the authoritarian regime 
(for details, see Vu and Yamada, 2017). We based our analyses on an instrumental approach 
in which the instrumental variables (a proxy for the educational costs posed to those who took 
the imperial examination) were set as the average distances from each district to the imperial 
test venues. Our findings addressed a gap in the literature while also enabling us to propose 
alternative mechanisms for transmission. 
2. Data and empirical strategy 
This study used an instrumental approach in which we regressed the number of 
contemporary top-ranked communists (𝑇𝑜𝑝	𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛 ) on the number of imperial elites 
(𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙	𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒) for each Vietnamese district. In this regard, we used two data sources. The 
first was a list containing the names of 2,888 imperial elites from Ngo (2006), while the second 
was a list of all (825) Central Committee members of the CPV (hereafter, top politicians) 
between 1930 and 2020 (taken from Vu and Yamada, 2017). These lists were compared to 
determine which individuals were operating in the same home districts. We were able to 
identify and match 2,839 imperial elites with 738 contemporary top politicians based on their 
respective home districts1. Ngo (2006) compiled the most comprehensive list of imperial elites 
who passed the imperial examination at the national level from 1075 to 1919 (i.e., throughout 
Vietnamese history), while Vu and Yamada (2017) compiled a list of contemporary top 
politicians based on their corresponding profiles from the official CPV website. The data 
consisted of 687 Vietnamese districts2. 
We then created three panels to analyze outcomes. Panel A’s outcome consisted of all 
top politicians (1930–2020), while Panel B’s consisted of affiliates of the first Central 
Committee of the CPV (1930–1951), and Panel C’s consisted of those in power subsequent to 
reunification (1976–2020) (excluding those who were also listed as Central Committee 
members in any previous period3) (see Appendix 1). District-level geographical data were used 
as controls (𝑋). We then calculated three other factors, including population density, the Kinh 
 
1 Some observations were omitted due to missing information concerning the home district. 
2 The district is the second administrative level in Vietnam. There were 689 in 2009. Two districts were omitted 
because they were missing necessary information for controls. 
3 The first Central Committee lasted from 1930 until 1951. Geneva Accords 1955 divided the country into North 
and South factions. Vietnamese reunification did not occur until 1975. Since the fourth Central Committee of the 
CPV in 1976, we found that all top-ranked politicians were born in 1921 or later, which was after the last imperial 
examination in 1919. 
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ethnic rate, and the ratio between the district population and country population as a weight for 
each district based on the 2009 Vietnam Population and Housing Census (conducted by the 
General Statistics Office of Vietnam). Controls also included croplands and urban land ratio 
from the 1992 Global Land Cover Characterization, elevations from the 1996 Landsat Imagery 
of the US Geological Survey, and distances to the coastline for each district from a country 
shape file obtained from the GADM (www.gadm.org). 
We used the following equation during the second stage of our empirical estimation: 
(1) 𝑇𝑜𝑝	𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛! =	𝛼". 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝚤𝑎𝑙	𝑒𝑙𝚤𝑡𝑒4 ! + 𝛼#. 𝑋! + 𝜀!, 
where X is the set of controls described in Appendix 1 and 𝑖 is the district. 
During the first stage, we used an instrumental variable (𝐼𝑉) for 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙	𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠, as follows: 
(2) 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙	𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒! =	𝛽". 𝐼𝑉! +	𝛽#. 𝑋! + 𝜖!. 
Based on a recent study by Vu and Yamada (2020), we used the average distance from 
each district to the imperial test venues as a proxy for the educational costs posed to those who 
took the imperial examination (i.e., the IV variable). We then used variations in imperial test 
venues (Table 1) and variations in territorial expansion throughout Vietnamese history, which 
nearly doubled between 1075 and 1919 (see Dell et al., 2018; Vu and Yamada, 2020). The 
average distance was strongly correlated with the number of imperial elites regardless of the 
added controls and district-fixed effects (Table 2). 
Table 1. Timelines and the number of imperial elites 
Examination years  
Dynasty Test venue Our raw data 
  Province District Times tested Number of imperial elites 
1075–1225 Ly  Hanoi Ba Dinh 4 11 
1232–1393 Tran  Hanoi Ba Dinh 16 49 
1400–1405 Ho Thanh Hoa Vinh Loc 3 11 
1426–1526 Le Hanoi Ba Dinh 32 1,008 
1529–1592 Mac Hanoi Ba Dinh 22 482 
1554–1595 Le Thanh Hoa Tho Xuan 8 51 
1598–1787 Le Hanoi Ba Dinh 64 723 
1822–1919 Nguyen Thua Thien Hue Hue 39 553 
Sum       188 2,888 
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Table 2. Correlations between the number of imperial elites and IV 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
The IV (distance) –0.007*** –0.059** –0.007*** –0.050** 
 (0.001) (0.026) (0.001) (0.024) 
Province fixed effect  Yes  Yes 
Other controls   Yes Yes 
N districts 687 687 687 687 
R-squared 0.239 0.584 0.371 0.618 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). P-weights were used in all 
estimations. Other controls were the 2009 Kinh ethnic ratio and population density, 1992 urban land ratio and 
cropland ratio, 1996 mean elevation, and the distance to coastlines in every estimation. 
 
3. Results and discussion 
We found that the imperial legacy was persistent in all panels (see Table 3). In Panel A, an 
additional imperial elite was associated with a 0.08–0.086 increase in the presence of top-
ranked communists who shared the same home district during 1930–2020. Meanwhile, the 
value was 0.008 for the first Central Committee in Panel B, and 0.056 in Panel C, in which all 
top politicians were born in 1921 or later. Further, F-statistics in the first stages demonstrated 
the validity of our instrumental variables. The results in Panel B may be partially explained by 
the hypothesis put forth by Bai and Jia (2016), given that the CPV was one of many 
revolutionary factions. However, this cannot explain the results in Panel C, in which all 
politicians were born after the last imperial examination in 1919. 
Table 3. Legacies and the number of contemporary top-ranked communists 
 
 Panel A  1930-2020 
  Panel B 1930-1951 
Panel C 
1976-2020 
 OLS IV-Second stage 
IV-Second 
stage 
IV-Second 
stage 
IV-Second 
stage 
Variables Top politician Top politician Top politician Top politician Top politician 
Imperial elite 0.042*** 0.080*** 0.086*** 0.008*** 0.056*** 
 (0.009) (0.014) (0.015) (0.002) (0.011) 
Other controls Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistics†  94.45 128.75 128.75 128.75 
N districts 687 687 687 687 687 
Notes: Same as Table 2. † Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic for testing H0: Weak identification test. 
 
We also propose several alternative hypotheses to explain the statistical results. First, 
home favoritism in Vietnam (Vu and Yamada, 2017) may incentivize top politicians to vote 
for younger candidates from the same home districts as those occupied by the later Central 
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Committee of the CPV. Second, top politicians may form small factions based on geographical 
proximity in order to concentrate their power. Third, the desire to reach the top class via 
learning culture (see Vu and Yamada, 2020; i.e., learning to win top positions through the 
imperial examinations) would have endured and been further magnified via mechanisms 
associated with the previous hypotheses. Meanwhile, the CPV was the only elite social ladder 
available between 1976 and 2020. 
4. Conclusion 
This study identified the existence of an historical legacy between imperial elites and 
contemporary top-ranked politicians in Vietnam. We argue that this is the result of historical 
transmission via informal institutions (learning/education) and the formation of home 
favoritism among compatriot politicians. 
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Appendix 1. Descriptive statistics using the district as a unit 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Imperial elite (number) 4.132 11.210 0 98 
Top politician (number)     
  Panel A 1.074 1.710 0 10 
  Panel B 0.047 0.218 0 2 
  Panel C 0.820 1.318 0 7 
Instrumental variable (km) 999.960 845.575 23.043 2127.534 
2009-Population density (1,000 per km2) 1.755 6.073 0.013 58.673 
2009-Kinh ethnic rate 0.756 0.333 0.018 1 
1992-Urban land rate 0.023 0.115 0 1 
1992-Cropland rate 0.470 0.316 0 1 
1996-Elevation mean (m) 216.259 309.712 1 1544.59 
Distance to coastal line (km) 86.02 84.78 0.23 434.57 
 
Note: Number of districts = 687. 
 
